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ber, it is nonetheless to be hoped that these events will be as successful as was the one in St. Joseph.

Mr. Speaker, I had the honor of delivering the principal address on the occasion of the pony express centennial in St. Joseph and under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I desire to include an editorial from the St. Joseph News-Press which touches upon my talk but more importantly discusses the relationship between the pony express and modern-day St. Joseph:

PRIDE AND INSPIRATION

There was inspiration in the remarks of Congressman WILLIAM R. HUIF at St. Joseph's salute to the pony express yesterday.

And there was inspiration for those in the crowd before the historic shrine of a bold era of American history in the re-enactment of those events of 100 years ago.

Today, St. Joseph's centennial program is a matter of history. It joins that first day of the pony express as another date in the years and events which are America.

But, for those who make the effort to take note of the day—and there were thousands—there is a touch of pride in self and city, and added inspiration for the future which wasn't there before.

St. Joseph, a city of wealth in things historical, could well look upon events of last weekend as a lesson in such things as pride and inspiration.

Those qualities run high among the people. And although the pony express centennial celebration was pushed by but a handful of this city's leaders, the people came through with an outpouring of participation far surpassing the expectation of anyone.

So, St. Joseph perhaps should take note. A city must be an inspiration to its residents to grow, open to survive. The material is here in abundance. If properly evaluated, its restoration and preservation properly directed and properly financed—privately or with public money—St. Joseph could become an effective tourist city—an endless inspiration to its residents and to those attracted to it.

If, however, we continue to overlook the value of our natural shrine, they will die a little each passing day—until there may be nothing inspirational remaining for those of other generations which someday may want again to pay respects to the historical greatness of St. Joseph.

Captive Europe and the Summit

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN S. MONAGAN

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, April 13, 1960

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I wish to draw the attention of the Members of Congress to a statement by Senator THOMAS J. DODD which appears as the lead article in the current issue of Free World Review.

In this article, Senator DODD makes the argument that we would be on sure ground—legally, morally, and politically—if we raise the issue of the captive nations at the forthcoming summit meetings and he argues further that this is the only way in which the West can go

over from its present defensive position to a diplomatic offensive.

Because of its significance, I include the text of Senator DODD's article, entitled "Captive Europe and the Summit," in the Record. I believe that Senator DODD has formulated his proposal in a manner which makes it appear both logical and politically realistic.

The article follows:

CAPTIVE EUROPE AND THE SUMMIT

(By THOMAS J. DODD, U.S. Senator)

If the Western Powers continue further along the path they followed so far at Geneva, the forthcoming summit conference may very well result in a new "Munich."

On the other hand, if the Western Powers go to the summit with a clear awareness of what is at stake, the summit may yet be used as an opportunity to seize the initiative from the Kremlin and reverse the sorry trend of recent years.

As the distinguished editors of Protracted Conflict have pointed out, the cold war has thus far been conducted according to a one-sided set of rules. It has always been fought on the territory of the free world, while the territory controlled by the Communist world has been considered sacrosanct. We have fought back against Communist offensives—sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully—but we have never ourselves launched a political offensive or counter-offensive.

I fear that if we continue to adhere to this self-imposed set of rules through very many more years of cold war, the free world will be lost.

At the forthcoming summit meeting the Communists will endeavor to confine the discussion to Berlin, as they did so successfully at Geneva. If we permit them thus to limit the agenda to the territory of the free world, the conference, almost inevitably, will result in a further retreat by the West. Somehow the West must find a way of going over to the offensive. But how do we do it, and at what points?

In my opinion, the only answer to this question is—the captive nations. On this issue we are on sure ground—legally, morally, and politically.

Legally, we can point to the series of post-war covenants assuring the captive nations of the right to choose their governments in democratic elections.

Morally, we can invoke the Atlantic Charter and we can point to the overwhelming vote by which the U.N. General Assembly condemned Soviet intervention in Hungary.

Politically, there is no issue on which the Kremlin is more sensitive or more vulnerable. There may have been a time when the Kremlin believed that it could crush the spirit of resistance in the captive nations and ultimately produce a generation of Communist robots. If they seriously entertained this illusion, the events of the past few years have certainly destroyed it. In quick succession there have been the East German uprising, the Polish uprising, the Polish revolt against Moscovite control, the Hungarian revolution, the Tibetan revolution.

That the will to freedom which exploded so heroically in Hungary in October 1956 remains unsubdued was once again proved by the spontaneous emotional mass demonstration which greeted Vice President Nixon in Warsaw. Marguerite Higgins quoted a senior European diplomat as saying that the Warsaw demonstration convinced him that, if it came to war, the Kremlin would have to place the whole of Poland under military occupation.

In my opinion, this is a great understatement. If it came to war in Europe, the Kremlin would have to place its entire satel-

lite empire and much of the territory of the Soviet Union under military occupation. This task alone would strain the resources of the 100 Red army divisions west of the Urals. As for the 75 satellite divisions, there is a far greater chance that they would fight on our side than that they would fight on the side of the Soviet Union.

I believe we should call Khrushchev's bluff by saying these things frankly to him. And, having done this, I believe we should place before the summit conference a package deal that calls for—

- (a) Free elections under U.N. supervision in East Germany and the captive nations;
- (b) Disengagement in depth on both sides of the prewar Soviet frontiers;
- (c) A nuclear test ban and a substantial degree of disarmament, with adequate inspection; and
- (d) Increased East-West trade, including the extension of credits.

The liberation of the captive nations, in my opinion, is the one objective for which we should be willing to pay with substantial reciprocal concessions. If the Soviets were to agree to liberation, then we could afford to offer such concessions without endangering our future security.

From the Soviet standpoint, the package deal I have outlined would have definite advantages. It would enable them to disembarass themselves of the troublesome, rebellious captive nations under the protection of a face-saving formula. It would offer them security, disarmament, trade credits—all objectives that have figured high on their list of demands. And, in pursuing this line of argument, it might be pointed out to them—in all accuracy—that their relations with independent, non-Communist Finland have in many respects been more satisfactory than their relations with some of their satellites.

In pursuing the objective of liberation, we should use all the devices of diplomacy. We must first of all establish our strength and persuade the enemy that we are aware of his weakness. We must place him on the defensive by shifting the arena of diplomatic controversy to territory under his control. We must offer counterconcessions that are not only intrinsically valid but provide the enemy with a face-saving formula. We must show ourselves as persistent in pursuit of our goals as the enemy is in pursuit of his.

And finally, we must hold forth to the world the possibility of genuine coexistence.

(The dictionary defines imperialism as a "doctrine leading to the territorial expansion of a state or to its domination of others.")

Year	Countries	Population (thousands)	Area (square miles)
ANNEXED OR UNDER SOVIET ADMINISTRATION			
1940	Part of Finland.....	450	17,600
1940	Estonia.....	1,122	18,300
1940	Latvia.....	1,051	25,400
1940	Lithuania.....	2,967	21,800
1945	Part of German East Prussia.....	1,197	6,400
1945	Part of Poland.....	11,800	69,900
1945	Part of Czechoslovakia.....	731	4,900
1945	Part of Rumania.....	3,700	19,400
	Total.....	23,896	182,400
CONTROLLED BY U.S.S.R.			
1945	East Germany.....	18,800	42,900
1945	Poland.....	20,600	120,355
1945	Czechoslovakia.....	12,340	49,381
1947	Hungary.....	9,750	35,902
1948	Rumania.....	16,100	91,664
1946	Bulgaria.....	7,100	42,701
1946	Albania.....	1,175	10,820
	Total.....	91,822	303,541